Countries facing voluntary export restraints (VERS) often adopt a two-tier allocation system for export licenses to the restricted market: (1) a "basic" allocation related to export shares to the restricted market; and (2) an "open" allocation based on export shares to the nonrestricted market. Such a two-tier allocation system increases exports to the nonrestricted market beyond the levels which would exist under a single-quota allocation system and has an efficiency cost as it results in some sales being made at less than marginal cost. The history of VER negotiations provides a rationale for such a policy and suggests that the recent increase in antidumping cases may be partly associated with the adoption of two-tier quota allocation systems. Nontariff barriers (NTBS) present a growing threat to a liberal world trading system and slow the relocation of mature industries from developed to developing countries. Among NTBS, voluntary export restraints (VERS) are proliferating and constitute a major element of the "new protectionism." Besides measuring the incidence of NTBS, research has concentrated on three aspects of VERS: the welfare cost to the imposing country, their attraction for both exporters and importers, and their "inefficacy." Analysis of the first issue has shown that because the exporting country operates the VER, there is a rent transfer from the importing country to the exporting country which is often larger than the distortionary costs associated with an "equivalent" tariff. Second, research indicates that VERS have endured because exporting countries receive the rent transfer, whereas for importing countries VERS can be imposed quickly and lack transparency and therefore attract fewer objections than outright subsidies to the industries seeking protection (see, for example, Bhagwati 1986).