Cross-Ownership: A Device for Management Entrenchment?
Copyright policy )Cross-Ownership: A Device for Management Entrenchment?
Abstract By artificially inflating capital and creating own shares, cross-ownership can be a key device for managerial entrenchment. This article proposes a game-theoretical method to measure the extent of shareholder expropriation through cross-ownership. By properly accounting for cross-ownership linkages, we show how managers can seize indirect voting rights, and so insulate their firms from outside control. Significant examples of cross-ownership are found not only in civil law countries, but also in the US mutual fund industry. We apply our method to Germany’s Allianz Group. This article paves the way to better regulatory appraisal of management entrenchment through cross-ownership.
- Université Libre de Bruxelles Belgium
Restructuring, Operations Research, Conflict Resolution, Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Conflict, managerial entrenchment, Statistical Decision Theory, Allianz Group, Elections, Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance, Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, C71, Corporate Governance, Mergers, D72, cross-ownership, Legislatures, Proxy Contests, Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances, G32, G34, D74, and Voting Behavior, Corporate governance, indirect voting rights, Cooperative Games, corporate control, Statistical Decision Theory; Operations Research, Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Acquisitions, Economie, shareholder expropriation, Alliances, Voting, Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure, Capital and Ownership Structure, C44, Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.)
Restructuring, Operations Research, Conflict Resolution, Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Conflict, managerial entrenchment, Statistical Decision Theory, Allianz Group, Elections, Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance, Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, C71, Corporate Governance, Mergers, D72, cross-ownership, Legislatures, Proxy Contests, Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances, G32, G34, D74, and Voting Behavior, Corporate governance, indirect voting rights, Cooperative Games, corporate control, Statistical Decision Theory; Operations Research, Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior, Acquisitions, Economie, shareholder expropriation, Alliances, Voting, Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure, Capital and Ownership Structure, C44, Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.)
selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources.This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).14 popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.Top 10% influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).Average impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.Average
Citations provided by BIP!Popularity provided by BIP!