Many writers have argued that it is, in fact, impossible to define private property-that the concept itself defies definition. If those arguments can be sustained, then disputes about the justifiability of private property are misconceived. Since private property is indefinable, it cannot serve as a useful concept in political and economic thought: nor can it be a point of interesting debate in political philosophy. Instead of talking about property, we should talk about more general features of economic organization (whether to have a market economy; if not, how the economy is to be managed; what principles of justice are to constrain economic institutions and policy; and so on) or, if we want to focus on individuals, about the detailed particular rights that people have to do certain things with certain objects-rights which vary considerably from case to case, from object to object, and from legal system to legal system. But, if these sceptical arguments hold, we should abandon the enterprise of arguing about private property as such-of saying that it is, or is not, conducive to liberty, prosperity, or