
doi: 10.1093/jeea/jvad015
AbstractThis paper elucidates the willingness of an autocrat to push through institutional reforms in a context where traditional authorities represented by religious clerics are averse to them and where the military control the means of repression and can potentially stage a coup. We show that although the autocrat always wants to co-opt the military, this is not necessarily true of the clerics. Exclusive co-option of the military obtains where the loyalty of the autocrat’s army is strong while the organizational strength of religious movements is rather low. Radical institutional reforms can then be implemented. Empirically, the dominant regime in contemporary Muslim countries is the regime of double co-option where the autocrat resorts to a double-edged tactic: pleasing the official clerics by slowing the pace of reforms and ensuring the loyalty of the military so as to put down clerics-led rebellions.
330, Lobbying, JEL: O - Economic Development, or Comparative, Formation, Elections, JEL: Z - Other Special Topics/Z.Z1 - Cultural Economics • Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology/Z.Z1.Z12 - Religion, Islam, Autocracy, Legislatures, and Regulation/N.N4.N40 - General, Operations, Innovation, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, JEL: N - Economic History/N.N4 - Government, and Voting Behavior, and Impact, International Relations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 320, Technological Change, Reforms, and Growth/O.O5 - Economywide Country Studies/O.O5.O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries, JEL: P - Economic Systems/P.P4 - Other Economic Systems/P.P4.P48 - Political Economy • Legal Institutions • Property Rights • Natural Resources • Energy • Environment • Regional Studies, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D02 - Institutions: Design, International, Army, War, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Law, Instrumentalization of religion
330, Lobbying, JEL: O - Economic Development, or Comparative, Formation, Elections, JEL: Z - Other Special Topics/Z.Z1 - Cultural Economics • Economic Sociology • Economic Anthropology/Z.Z1.Z12 - Religion, Islam, Autocracy, Legislatures, and Regulation/N.N4.N40 - General, Operations, Innovation, [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE, JEL: N - Economic History/N.N4 - Government, and Voting Behavior, and Impact, International Relations, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, 320, Technological Change, Reforms, and Growth/O.O5 - Economywide Country Studies/O.O5.O57 - Comparative Studies of Countries, JEL: P - Economic Systems/P.P4 - Other Economic Systems/P.P4.P48 - Political Economy • Legal Institutions • Property Rights • Natural Resources • Energy • Environment • Regional Studies, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D02 - Institutions: Design, International, Army, War, JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Law, Instrumentalization of religion
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