
handle: 10419/89646 , 2158/987621
Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect credit market. In the presence of credit rationing, the parties may not reach an agreement. If they do, the agreement will be inefficient and give one party more utility than the other. Efficiency and utility equalization are guaranteed only by a legally enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce, and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but neither of them guarantees utility equalization. (JEL codes: C78, J12, K36)
divorce legislation, contracts, hold-up problem, separate-property marriage, community-property marriage, divorce legislation, K36, ddc:330, J12, marriage; hold-up problem, hold-up problem, separate-property marriage, contracts, community-property marriage, C78, jel: jel:C78, jel: jel:J12, jel: jel:K36
divorce legislation, contracts, hold-up problem, separate-property marriage, community-property marriage, divorce legislation, K36, ddc:330, J12, marriage; hold-up problem, hold-up problem, separate-property marriage, contracts, community-property marriage, C78, jel: jel:C78, jel: jel:J12, jel: jel:K36
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