Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality

Paul Dicken

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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Article . 2007 . Peer-reviewed

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Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Sep 2007 English Publisher:University of Chicago PressJournal:The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, volume 58, pages 605-612 (issn: 0007-0882, eissn: 1464-3537,

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Authors: Paul Dicken;

doi: 10.1093/bjps/axm020

Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality

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Abstract

James Ladyman ([2000]) argues that constructive empiricism is untenable because it cannot adequately account for modal statements about observability. In this paper, I attempt to resist Ladyman's conclusion, arguing that the constructive empiricist can grant his modal discourse objective, theory-independent truth-conditions, yet without compromising his empiricism.1Ladyman's dilemma2Constructive empiricism and modal agnosticism3Conclusion

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University of Cambridge
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