N 'The Incompatibility of Omnipotence and Omniscience' (ANALYSIS 33.5) I argued that an omniscient being cannot create a finite being, b, who performs an act known only to himself and to no other being because an omniscient being must know about every act performed by every finite being. I also argued that an omnipotent being could create b and that, hence, no being can be both omnipotent and omniscient. I am no longer convinced that the argument can be sustained, because I have found two ways of escaping that argument. Professor Godbey, also, has noticed the second of them (see the preceding article in this journall), but he does not draw what seems to me to be a consequence of this way of escaping the argument. For both of these possible escapes expose a fundamental difficulty in the view ascribable to some, though perhaps only a minority, of the exponents of traditional theism, that God is both a logically necessary being and immutable with respect to being omniscient. Further, this latter problem can be stated without considering the rather difficult question of whether or not logical necessity is a property only of propositions. Let us say that a being is mutably-omniscient if and only if at some time or other he knows everything there is to be known at that time and it is possible that there be some other time either prior to or posterior to the time in question at which there is something he does not know. We will say that a being is immutably-omniscient if and only if he knows everything at every moment in time and it is impossible for him to ever fail to know anything. Now a mutably-omniscient being could create, say at T1, a being, b, who performs an act known only to himself and to no other being, because b must obviously perform the act at some time, T2, posterior to the time, T1, of his creation. Of course, once b has performed the act in question our mutably-omniscient being is no longer omniscient. The point, though, is that the mutably-omniscient being could create b while possessing the property of being omniscient. So, a being can be both omnipotent and omniscient and my argument fails on the ground that an omniscient being can create b. But on this ground my argument fails only if the being is omnipotent and mutably-omniscient. Clearly an immutably-omniscient being could not create b, and traditional theism, it would appear, requires the notion of immutable omniscience. As I understand traditional theism, God is omniscient, and omniscience is not a property He can possess at one time and not at another time. So the traditional theist cannot escape my argument by claiming that an omniscient being can create b even though