Abstract This chapter starts by investigating the idea of reasonable disagreement, a concept that is central to political liberal accounts of cooperation in the face of conflict. It then considers Matthew Kramer’s argument that there is no neutral solution available to the disagreement over abortion. The chapter argues that Kramer’s account has wider application, and identifies a neutralist dilemma. The neutralist dilemma applies when, of two policy options available to the state, one is unreasonable. It follows that the state should enact only the reasonable policy. However, in a neutralist dilemma the fact of reasonable disagreement due to the burdens of judgment means that it is not possible for the state to act at all, whether legislating or not, without deviating from neutrality. The chapter develops the concept of the neutralist dilemma and then applies it to another case discussed by Kramer: infant circumcision. The chapter argues that the debate over infant circumcision can be framed as a neutralist dilemma, but that the most plausible resolution of the dilemma results in an argument in favour of the legal prohibition of the practice.