In the contemporary sociolegal literature, few concepts are invoked more frequently, and with less clarity of meaning and purpose, than that of social control. The ambiguity of the concept is due in large part to its circuitous historical provenance.' The early Chicago sociologists coined the term to signify the interpersonal foundations of the self and social order.2 Parsons synthesized it with elements of Durkheim and Freud as a central component of his social systems theory: Social control in his view was not just an interactional process, but a structural sine qua non of a healthy society.3 Partly in reaction to the smugness of the Parsonsian model, labeling theorists hewed closer to the original Chicago interpretation and gave the concept a critical spin by emphasizing the iatrogenic nature of much deviant behavior4 and by arguing that social control is not a systematic imperative but rather a construction of self-interested "moral entrepreneurs."5 More recent critical scholars-a category that includes a wide range of theoretical perspectives,