I suppose I should be flattered that, in a work which is ostensibly a review of Mark Kelman's Guide to Critical Legal Studies, Professor Fischl devotes the bulk of his analytical efforts to sustained attack on my earlier review of Kelman's book.1 After all, as the adage has it, never mind what they say about you so long as they are talking about you. I am not moved to respond by the occasionally ad hominem nature of Fischl's remarks, though it is always distressing to see scholarly discourse descend to that level,2 nor do I intend by this response to rebut Fischl's supposedly "quote by quote and citation by citation" (p. 784) attack on my review. Anyone who really cares whether I have done justice to Kelman can read Kelman, read my review, and form their own opinion. Rather, I wish to comment briefly on two aspects of Fischl's essay: (1) his failure to mention, much less attempt to refute, my central criticism of Kelman and the entire CLS project, and (2) his failure to understand why it is that CLS has invited the question that killed it. The fundamental failure of the CLS enterprise is not so much the failure of CLS to describe, however tentatively, any alternative state of being. As I will explain below, that omission, while important, assumes its significance mostly by the very nature of the CLS effort, and thus severely undermines the utility of CLS observations.3 A far more central failing of