RICHARD POSNER, writing in 1969, asserted that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was significantly impaired in its task of promoting the public interest by the commission's dependence on Congress.' To make this point Posner employed a model of antitrust pork barrel. He emphasized that each member of Congress is obligated to protect and further the provincial interests of the citizens of the jurisdiction that he represents. Specifically, "the welfare of his constituents may depend disproportionately on a few key industries. The promotion of the industries becomes one of his most important duties as a representative of the district."2 Moreover, because the power to control the FTC is so unevenly distributed among members of Congress, the potential exists for each member of powerful subcommittees to exercise "a great deal of power to advance the interests of businesses located in his district however unimportant the interests may be from a national standpoint."3 Posner concluded that FTC investigations are seldom in the public interest and are initiated "at the behest of corporations, trade associations, and trade