As A MATTER of history modern democracy and the competitive political party system arose together. The fascists and the communists have shown that they die together. Indeed it seems reasonably clear that democracy cannot exist on a national scale without an effective party system. This suggests that for every weakness in a nation's party structure there may be a corresponding flaw in the democracy that rests upon it. Perhaps, then, irresponsible parties invite judicial "legislation," while responsible parties discourage it. In this view the difference between parliamentary supremacy and judicial supremacy is related to the difference between responsible and irresponsible parties. In short, perhaps the British political system discourages judicial "pretension"despite the British Marbury v. Madison' that was Dr. Bonham's case.2 Conversely, perhaps our relatively loose-knit, amorphous parties-that seldom reflect cohesive popular majorities-leave something of a political gap for courts to occupy. Surely it is not by chance that American conservatives, skeptical of majority rule, have traditionally favored non-responsible parties and judicial review-all in the name of "protection for minorities." Nor is it strange that the liberal tradition questions judicial review and irresponsible parties precisely because in the past they have frustrated majority rule by "protecting" upper class minorities-not minorities in general.3 All this suggests simply that judicial "pretension" will be as effective as a nation's political structure permits it be-that judicial "legislation" thrives upon flaws in the political party process. In any case this-the present thesis -seems reasonably clear: court intrusion upon national policy has thrived in this country only when our party system has been unusually weak.4