SINCE my earlier discussion of the concept of duties to oneself,1 no less than five further discussions of the topic have appeared.2 Since a number of these raise objections that are very acute, I feel it incumbent on me to attempt some sort of reply, and where I cannot meet the objections that have been made, to confess that I was in error. At least I may be able to clarify some points in my argument that I may not have made perfectly clear. Briefly stated, my argument was basically that it is actually impossible for there to be any duties to oneself, in any literal sense, for, if taken literally, the idea involves a contradiction. What are called "duties to oneself" are either not genuine moral duties at all, or, if they are, they are not duties to oneself. This argument was based essentially on the three following propositions: (1) If A has a duty to B, then B has a right against (or with respect to) A; (2) if B has a right against A, he can give it up and release A from the obligation; and (3) no one can release himself from an obligation. From this it followed, I argued, that if one could have a duty to oneself, then one would have a right against oneself-which would surely be nonsenseand furthermore that this alleged duty to oneself would be a "duty" from which one could release oneself at will, which is selfcontradictory. I argued further that expressions in which such "duties" are imputed must be interpreted as metaphorical, and that the same applies to such expressions as "I promised myself to . . ." and "I owe it to myself to. . . ." My conclusion, then, was that to say that someone has a duty to himself to do something is an emphatic way of asserting that he has a right to do it and that it would be foolish or imprudent for him not to. Now what I propose to do is to consider some of the main objections that have been made to this argument, as well as to some of the subsidiary points I made along the way.