thesis of this paper is that most of the confusion and disputation I on the problem of relativism and absolutism in ethics is due to a failure to make a proper distinction between the right and the good. If this distinction is properly maintained, it will, I believe, be found that there is a general consensus of opinion on the major issues among nearly all moral philosophers and the great majority of civilized people. There also appears a happy solution from the standpoints of the disputants themselves, for the relativists are shown to be correct as to the nature of the good, while the absolutist can claim the honors on the question of the nature of the right. The good is relative; the right' is absolute. We may begin with the relativity of the good. As long as we confine ourselves to the range of "natural, 12 as distinct from "moral," good the truth of relativism is obvious. "Moral" goodness is the unique kind of goodness (worth or value) that belongs to a person or an act as a result of the doing of what he or she believes to be morally right. All other goods are, according to this classification, "natural." They include the whole remaining range of values-physical, aesthetic, and intellectual. The degree of goodness of such goods is obviously relative to individual differences in the persons for whom they are good. What is a good for one person may even be bad