In his recent "The Identity of Indiscernibles," Ian Hacking writes approvingly of Leibniz's use of the Identity of Indiscernibles (I/I) "as a nutcracker to crush absolute space" ([3], p. 251). Hacking's point, often made in the literature, is that the familiar spatiotemporal examples, such as a universe consisting of only two otherwise identical objects (say two raindrops) at different spatial locations, cannot show that the I/I is false since they are question begging. They presuppose absolute (or substantial) space (or space-time) which itself is incompatible with the I/I. In fact, Hacking concludes that it is not only the familiar examples that are at fault. Rather, it is simply "vain to contemplate possible spatiotemporal worlds to refute or establish the identity of indiscernibles" ([3], p. 249). Perhaps Hacking is right about this last point-it depends, I suspect, on what one takes the proper statement of the I/I to be. The point I want to make here is just that rather than being a "nutcracker" which crushes absolute space, the I/I provides no reason for thinking space (or space-time) is not an absolute or substantial entity. Indeed, I think the situation is reversed. If the I / I is incompatible with the existence of absolute space (or space-time), that would provide good reason for thinking the I/I is false. Consider, then, the Leibnizian argument, using the I/I, against absolute space: If there were absolute space (space-time), then the possible world consisting of the totality of the material universe displaced "rigidly" ten feet in a certain direction would be a different universe than the actual universe. But, argues the Leibnizian, since all the properties material entities have, and all the relations they bear to each other are the same in these two universes, there is no discernible difference between them. Thus, by the I/I, there are not two different universes here and so the hypothesis which leads us to think there are two different universes, namely that there is