Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Dec 1994 English Publisher:University of Chicago PressJournal:Journal of Political Economy, volume 102, pages 1,175-1,199 (issn: 0022-3808, eissn: 1537-534X,

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Authors: Garen, John E;

doi: 10.1086/261967

Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory

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Abstract

The empirical literature on executive compensation generally fails to specify a model of executive pay on which to base and test hypotheses regarding its determinants. In contrast, this paper analy...

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