How rapidly does the public adjust its price expectations during wartime? ' Many writers, including M. Friedman and some of his former students (1952, 1956), have studied the pace of adjustment of price expectations in wartime economies, as revealed by changes in the ex post behavior of the real stock of money and various measures of velocity. The article by G. E. Makinen, recently published in this Journal (1971), in which he examined the Korean data for the wartime years, 1950-53, and the Vietnamese data for more recent years, can be considered as another attempt to shed more light on this issue and should be welcome. It is my judgment, however, that Makinen's findings (pp. 1237-42) regarding drastic changes in Korean "expenditure" velocity between 1949 and 1951 are incorrect.2 Makinen computed a 44 percent reduction in velocity during 1950 (table 14, p. 1237). Invoking Cagan's two-lag hypothesis to explain this drop and subsequent rise in velocity, Makinen claims that there was a long lag in the adjustment of price expectations as evidenced by actual balances running ahead of desired balances in 1950. It is my contention that lags of such magnitudes were not evident in the Korean experience, and Makinen's conclusion resulted from a faulty handling of statistical information. When examined within a simple equation of exchange framework, it will be discovered that Makinen's estimated value for velocity is simply inconsistent with known values of the other terms in the equation. A further investigation makes it quite obvious that Makinen used an unduly low estimate for 1950 GNP and an unduly high value for 1949 imports of goods and services.3 It is known that real output declined by 15.1