IN DECEMBER 1921, Lord Curzon explained to the French ambassador: "British foreign policy was now not the policy of the cabinet in Downing Street alone, but was the policy of the Empire, and the points of view of the Prime Ministers of our distant Dominions had also to be seriously considered."' No doubt he was reflecting, probably with regret, on the recent gathering of the statesmen of the emerging Commonwealth, which had provided the vital stimulus to bring about the Washington Conference.2 This conference would complete some of the unfinished business of the peacemaking at Paris, for no lasting solution had been found there for Far Eastern and Pacific problems, which had now become more acute. Britain, the United States, and Japan were the leading naval powers, China remained the most urgent problem, the balance of power in the Orient had been disrupted, and Japanese opportunism continued to threaten. A serious deterioration in Japanese-American relations had taken place, accompanied by the prospect of a naval race and by rumors of war on both sides of the Pacific. This uncertain situation seemed to provide opportunities for Anglo-American cooperation, but they had been missed; relations between London and Washington were not close, and the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance seemed to be partially responsible. These issues, therefore, came to focus on the problem of the renewal of the alliance and brought this last remnant of "old diplomacy" under scrutiny and criticism in London, Washington, and Ottawa. The existence of the alliance bred suspicion in the United States, and it provided a useful tool for the anglophobes there and those who wanted a navy second to none. Japan had acted in fine disregard of the spirit and letter of the alliance, but Britain saw no convincing alternative, for the alliance insured against future dangers, and present discomforts therefore had to be tolerated. Indeed, as in the prewar years, Britain's strategic predicament tended to overcome her distrust of Japan. Canada looked for peace and stability in the Orient and feared the conse1 Great Britain, Parliamentary papers, 1924, Vol. XXVI ("Accounts and papers," Vol. XIV), Cmd. 2169, "Papers respecting negotiations for an Anglo-French pact." 2 The accepted account has been J. B. Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," Political science quarterly, L (1935), 45-57. Brebner based his article largely on information acquired from J. W. Dafoe of the Manitoba Free press, through J. T. Shotwell, and both Borden and Meighen accepted it as an accurate account of the imperial meeting (Dafoe to R. MacGregor Dawson, May 23, 1935, Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, J. W. Dafoe papers, reel 5 M.77). Subsequently three articles were published on the subject. The most important is J. S. Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference," Canadian historical review, XXIX (1948), 143-52. Of less value are M. Tate and F. Foy's "More light on the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Political science quarterly, LXXIV (1959), 532-53, and J. C. Vinson's "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Pacific historical review, XXXI (1962), 257-66.