FRENCH constitutional experience under the Old Regime furnishes an interesting case study in the failure of a parliamentary institution to mature after it had apparently taken root. The estates general, despite a long and eventful career, ultimately succumbed when formidable obstacles seemed to prevent their transformation from an assembly of humble, class-minded, provincial petitioners to a national, sovereign, legislative body. The institution abolished itself by the resolution of June I7, I789.' Reasons for the inadequacy of the estates general as a national legislative assembly were numerous. Evidence seems to indicate that not the least important of these reasons was the apparent inability of the deputies to assume the status and powers necessary to becoming effective representatives of the French nation. It was the mandate principle, in particular the mantdat irmp&ralif, through which this particular shortcoming of the estates general most clearly expressed itself. Although representative government has frequently appeared in the past on municipal and provincial levels, its growth and significance in recent times have, for the most part, coincided with that of national government. As the feudal monarchy was gradually displaced by the national state system, deputies to the various medieval assemblies were required to become more than parochial delegates in order to adapt themselves to the changing pattern of political and social life. It was necessary for them to become representatives of the nation as a whole with power to decide issues in a manner that would be binding upon all constituents. This change occurred in England quite casually.2 By the eighteenth century William Blackstone was able to write: "Every member [of parliament], though chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned, serves for the whole