
doi: 10.1086/209978
This article develops a model of noncompetitive labor markets in which high‐wage (good) and low‐wage (bad) jobs coexist. Minimum wages and unemployment benefits shift the composition of employment toward high‐wage jobs. Because the composition of jobs in the laissez‐faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low‐wage jobs, these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare.
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 290 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 1% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 1% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% |
