I f I understand him correctly, Cooper's (1987) recent comment on Anderson (1986) takes issue with my claim that "truth" plays no role in the ontology of critical relativism. He states that "Without denying the importance that the scientific culture has in what is published and accepted in a research domain, one can still seek something firmer (than conventional agreement) in science" (Cooper 1987, p. 126). Unfortunately, it is not at all clear to me what Cooper believes would provide a more secure undergirding for scientific knowledge. Indeed, I must admit to some confusion as to what it is that Cooper actually means by "truth." His penultimate paragraph employs the word four times, but it is not obvious that the meaning is the same on each iteration. Fortunately, a reviewer suggested that some clarification might be found in Shapere (1977) and in Cooper and Levine (1985). This,.,combined with access to an unpublished manuscript by Cooper (1986) and some helpful comments from a second reviewer, made it clear that Cooper's concept of "truth" is being driven by a commitment to two very different forms of realism.