In this chapter, we extend the extended rationality view presented in Chapter 4 to the case of inductive reasoning (§1). In particular, to the principle on which enumerative inductions are based, that is the one that Hume called “the principle of the uniformity of nature”. We then propose its extension to the case of memory-based and testimonial justifications and their characteristic assumptions, or hinges, such as “There is a past”, “Informants are generally reliable” and, perhaps surprisingly, “There are other minds” (§2–3). It is argued that each of these kinds of justification is central to some aspect of epistemic rationality, considered in its full-blown version. That is to say, as involving not just perceptual justifications for present-tense propositions about mid-size objects currently perceived, but also inductive, diachronic, and social elements. Namely, justifications for generalized empirical propositions based on induction, for past-tense propositions based on memory, and justifications for propositions that are obtained through testimony.