The Great Powers did not approve of Italy’s latest territorial acquisition. Britain and France in particular feared the consequences of the Dodecanese falling into the hands of Germany, Italy’s powerful ally.1 Close to both the Dardenelles and the Suez Canal, and within sight of Asia Minor, the Dodecanese were widely recognised as having much strategic significance, and many believed that Italy’s foothold in the region would be a destabilising influence in the Near East. But as Richard Bosworth has shown in his works on Italian foreign policy before the First World War, Italy was largely able to keep the islands due to the duplicity and remarkable skill of her diplomats. They exploited the precarious condition of the Concert of Europe in the period leading up to 1914, during which one international crisis followed another, and when few of the Great Powers were prepared to alienate potential allies like Italy.2 Her ‘patron’ in international affairs, Britain, actively opposed the occupation of the Dodecanese, but Britain stopped short of exerting real pressure, preferring to accept Italian undertakings that the occupation was temporary. In the meantime, the Italians sought to trade the islands to secure other interests, such as political influence in southern Albania, and economic concessions in Asia Minor.