
doi: 10.1051/ro/2014012
handle: 11693/12516
This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge . It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.
Strong Berge equilibrium, Games with strategic complementarities, Fixed Point Theory, Fixed point theory, Strong Berge Equilibrium, Refinement, Games With Strategic Complementarities, Supermodularity
Strong Berge equilibrium, Games with strategic complementarities, Fixed Point Theory, Fixed point theory, Strong Berge Equilibrium, Refinement, Games With Strategic Complementarities, Supermodularity
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