
Summary: Considered here is repeated interaction among economic agents. These must share privately held user rights to diverse production factors. The disparate features of the resulting economy motivate a solution concept which blends Cournot/Nash equilibrium with that of Walras. A novelty comes by showing that integrated equilibrium may emerge via adaptive behavior and repeated play.
T57-57.97, Applied mathematics. Quantitative methods, QA1-939, Multistage and repeated games, General equilibrium theory, Mathematics, Cournot-Walras equilibrium, repeated games
T57-57.97, Applied mathematics. Quantitative methods, QA1-939, Multistage and repeated games, General equilibrium theory, Mathematics, Cournot-Walras equilibrium, repeated games
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