
pmid: 10548928
This paper explores the relationship between concepts of probability and hermeneutics. It seeks to examine the relationship between subjective (Bayesian) views of probability and hermeneutic descriptions of understanding. It is argued that Gadamer's account of the prejudicial nature of understanding, derived from Heidegger's analysis of foreunderstanding, offers a provocative model of clinical reasoning. The implications of this model for "evidence-based" medicine are discussed in conclusion.
Evidence-Based Medicine, Humans, Bayes Theorem, Philosophy, Medical, Prejudice, Decision Support Techniques, Probability
Evidence-Based Medicine, Humans, Bayes Theorem, Philosophy, Medical, Prejudice, Decision Support Techniques, Probability
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