
In this brief note, the author recalls some examples of statements that use modal notions but which, it would seem, cannot be represented adequately by the usual modal logics. The notions involved are those of believing, knowing, intending, desiring, and being under an obligation; the examples are gathered mainly from earlier publications of the author, going back to 1978.
Logic in artificial intelligence, knowledge, Knowledge representation, Modal logic (including the logic of norms), belief, modal logic
Logic in artificial intelligence, knowledge, Knowledge representation, Modal logic (including the logic of norms), belief, modal logic
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