
arXiv: 0904.2061
In this paper, we address the selfish bin covering problem, which is greatly related both to the bin covering problem, and to the weighted majority game. What we mainly concern is how much the lack of coordination harms the social welfare. Besides the standard PoA and PoS, which are based on Nash equilibrium, we also take into account the strong Nash equilibrium, and several other new equilibria. For each equilibrium, the corresponding PoA and PoS are given, and the problems of computing an arbitrary equilibrium, as well as approximating the best one, are also considered.
16 pages
FOS: Computer and information sciences, Selfish bin covering, price of anarchy, Weighted majority games, price of stability, Nash equilibrium, selfish bin covering, Theoretical Computer Science, Noncooperative games, Price of stability, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Combinatorial games, weighted majority games, Price of anarchy, Computer Science(all), Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
FOS: Computer and information sciences, Selfish bin covering, price of anarchy, Weighted majority games, price of stability, Nash equilibrium, selfish bin covering, Theoretical Computer Science, Noncooperative games, Price of stability, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Combinatorial games, weighted majority games, Price of anarchy, Computer Science(all), Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
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