
AbstractBased on the theory of rent-seeking, this paper analyzes the behaviors and relationships between the owner, supervision and contractor in engineering supervision. The paper establishes a game model of the engineering rent-seeking behavior and relationship. Based on the game equilibrium solution, a conclusion is drawn that owner should improve the monitoring efficiency and make powerful punishment to rent-seeking behaviors in order to effectively restrain the rent-seeking behaviors in engineering supervision.
Engineering supervision, rent-seeking behavior, game theory ;
Engineering supervision, rent-seeking behavior, game theory ;
| selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 4 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Average | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Average | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
