
By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.
FOS: Economics and business, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, dictatorial power, Economics - Theoretical Economics, Voting theory, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), Social choice, manipulability, tops-only rules
FOS: Economics and business, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, dictatorial power, Economics - Theoretical Economics, Voting theory, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), Social choice, manipulability, tops-only rules
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