On the diffusion of competing innovations
Copyright policy )On the diffusion of competing innovations
This paper examines how discounting shapes the probability that a product innovator grants an innovation for licensing to a firm interested in this innovation, when innovations are perfect substitute and firms are competitive. The discounting refers, of course, to the potential profit of the innovator from offering its innovation for licensing. The analysis takes place within the context of game theory. It is found out that more competition in the market for the innovation may induce lower innovation diffusion and lower welfare in the downstream market.
- Shanghai University of Finance and Economics China (People's Republic of)
- Stony Brook University United States
- Rhodes College United States
- Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya Israel
competing innovators, innovation diffusion, licensing delay, Production theory, theory of the firm, perfect substitute innovations, patent licensing
competing innovators, innovation diffusion, licensing delay, Production theory, theory of the firm, perfect substitute innovations, patent licensing
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