Strictly strategy-proof auctions
Copyright policy )Strictly strategy-proof auctions
A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict monotonicity plus the envelope formula, echoing a well-known characterisation of (weak) strategy-proofness. A consequence is that strategy-proofness can be made strict by an arbitrarily small modification, so that strictness is 'essentially for free'.
strategy-proof, auction, robustness, Mechanism design theory, mechanism design, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, FOS: Economics and business, Economics - Theoretical Economics, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), dominant strategy, virtual, Mechanism design, Auction, Strategy-proof, Dominant strategy, Robustness, Virtual
strategy-proof, auction, robustness, Mechanism design theory, mechanism design, Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models, FOS: Economics and business, Economics - Theoretical Economics, Theoretical Economics (econ.TH), dominant strategy, virtual, Mechanism design, Auction, Strategy-proof, Dominant strategy, Robustness, Virtual
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