Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Jul 2007 English Publisher:Elsevier BVJournal:Journal of Economic Theory, volume 135, pages 590-593 (issn: 0022-0531,

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Authors: Andrea Attar; Gwenaël Piaser; Nicolás Porteiro;

doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.006

Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions

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Abstract

Abstract In a recent paper, Peters [Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency, J. Econ. Theory 111 (2003) 189–228] identifies a set of restrictions on players’ preferences, called “no-externalities assumption”, under which, in common agency games, there is no loss of generality in restricting principals’ strategies to be take-it or leave-it offers. The present note provides an example to show that these conditions are not sufficient when the agent takes a non-contractible action.

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