The supercore for normal-form games
Copyright policy )The supercore for normal-form games
We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners’ dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nash equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nash equilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets. Financial support from projects 3699/2001, UPV HB-8238/2000, and BEC 2000-0301 is gratefully acknowledged. Inarra also acknowledges the hospitality of Brown University and the financial support from the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, PR 2003-0287.
Morgenstern stable set, \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\), individual contingent threat situation, Nash equilibrium, subsolution, Von Neumann, Morgenstern stable set, Von Neumann, Nash equilibrium, MATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS, Cooperative games, subsolution, individual contingent threat situation, C70, von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set, jel: jel:C70
Morgenstern stable set, \(n\)-person games, \(n>2\), individual contingent threat situation, Nash equilibrium, subsolution, Von Neumann, Morgenstern stable set, Von Neumann, Nash equilibrium, MATHEMATICAL AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS, Cooperative games, subsolution, individual contingent threat situation, C70, von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set, jel: jel:C70
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