On Quantitative Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols
Copyright policy )On Quantitative Analysis of Probabilistic Protocols
AbstractWe advocate the use of approximate noninterference for the security analysis of probabilistic protocols. Our approach relies on a formalisation of the protocol in the setting of a probabilistic process algebra and a notion of process similarity based on weak probabilistic bisimulation. We illustrate this approach by presenting the analysis of a probabilistic nonrepudiation protocol which allows us to quantitatively estimate its fairness degree.
- University of Verona Italy
- University of Urbino Italy
- University of Pisa Italy
Approximate Noninterference, Process Equivalence, Case Study, Approximate Noninterference, Process Equivalence, Probabilistic Process Algebra, Probabilistic Process Algebra, Theoretical Computer Science, Computer Science(all)
Approximate Noninterference, Process Equivalence, Case Study, Approximate Noninterference, Process Equivalence, Probabilistic Process Algebra, Probabilistic Process Algebra, Theoretical Computer Science, Computer Science(all)
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