
arXiv: 1510.07424
Random dictatorship has been characterized as the only social decision scheme that satisfies efficiency and strategyproofness when individual preferences are strict. We show that no extension of random dictatorship to weak preferences satisfies these properties, even when significantly weakening the required degree of strategyproofness.
D.7, FOS: Computer and information sciences, D.8, C.6, C.6; D.7; D.8, Social choice, random dictatorship, Individual preferences, stochastic dominance, Pareto-efficiency, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, strategyproofness, Computer Science - Multiagent Systems, Multiagent Systems (cs.MA), Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
D.7, FOS: Computer and information sciences, D.8, C.6, C.6; D.7; D.8, Social choice, random dictatorship, Individual preferences, stochastic dominance, Pareto-efficiency, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, strategyproofness, Computer Science - Multiagent Systems, Multiagent Systems (cs.MA), Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
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