
handle: 11245/1.548104 , 11245/1.417624 , 10419/96849
AbstractWe measure participants’ willingness to pay for transparently useless authority—the right to make a completely uninformed task decision. We further elicit participants’ beliefs about receiving their preferred outcome if they make the decision themselves, and if another participant makes the decision for them. We find that participants pay more to make the decision themselves if they also believe that they can thus increase the probability of getting their preferred outcome. Illusion of control therefore exists in a controlled laboratory environment with monetary incentives and is connected to peoples’ pursuit of authority.
330, ddc:330, 150, allocation of decision rights, illusion of control, C91, control preferences, illusion of control, allocation of decision rights, D80, D23, control preferences, jel: jel:D80, jel: jel:C91, jel: jel:D23
330, ddc:330, 150, allocation of decision rights, illusion of control, C91, control preferences, illusion of control, allocation of decision rights, D80, D23, control preferences, jel: jel:D80, jel: jel:C91, jel: jel:D23
| citations This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | 32 | |
| popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network. | Top 10% | |
| influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically). | Top 10% | |
| impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network. | Average |
