Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Preprint 01 May 2002 Netherlands Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLCJournal:International Journal of Game Theory, volume 30, pages 567-599 (issn: 0020-7276, eissn: 1432-1270,

Copyright policy )

Authors: Maurice Koster; Elisenda Molina; Yves Sprumont; S. H. Tijs;

doi: 10.1007/s001820200099

handle: 11245/1.203157

Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations

- Summary
- Subjects
- Metrics

Abstract

zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Country

Netherlands

Related Organizations

Keywords

Cooperative game theory, constrained egalitarianism, core, Trees, Cooperative games, tree games, Deterministic network models in operations research, cost sharing, Cooperative game theory · cost sharing · tree games · core · constrained egalitarianism., jel: jel:C71

Impact byBIP!

	selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	19
	popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.	Top 10%
	influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	Top 10%
	impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.	Top 10%