Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 19 Apr 2001 English Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLCJournal:Social Choice and Welfare, volume 18, pages 303-326 (issn: 0176-1714,

Copyright policy )

Authors: John H. Nachbar;

doi: 10.1007/pl00007181

Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information

- Summary
- Subjects
- Metrics

Abstract

zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Related Organizations

University of Washington
United States
University of Mary
United States

Keywords

Multistage and repeated games, Rationality and learning in game theory

Impact byBIP!

	selected citations These citations are derived from selected sources. This is an alternative to the "Influence" indicator, which also reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	16
	popularity This indicator reflects the "current" impact/attention (the "hype") of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network.	Average
	influence This indicator reflects the overall/total impact of an article in the research community at large, based on the underlying citation network (diachronically).	Top 10%
	impulse This indicator reflects the initial momentum of an article directly after its publication, based on the underlying citation network.	Top 10%