The sociological theory of action does not deal very extensively with the body of the actor; it simply presupposes the body as a factual basis of action. In most cases the concept of action only refers to the biological or anthropological foun? dations of man's capacities, when it has to be defended against reductionist objections. Thus the classical debate between the concepts of action and of behavior, "Handlung" and "Verhalten", often goes back to biological knowl? edge. Furthermore, biological arguments have considerable influence in debates on the internal differentiation of the concept of action, especially in distinguish? ing symbolically mediated interaction with fellow subjects from instrumental action toward objects. In spite of this, there remain at least two deficiencies in the theory of action that could only be superseded by a more precise examination of the role of the body in human action. First, the theory of action as such is rather helpless when it meets the objection that there is something like an activist bias in the emphasis on action. This emphasis can only be understood in the context of a certain highly specific culture which underestimates aesthetic sensitivity and a human attitude toward the "fate", that is, the unintended and unexpected events of life. Second, one can certainly speak of an instrumentalist restriction of the role of the body, when the body is seen as a permanently available instrument of action. This instrumentalist restriction cannot only be found in theories of instrumental ac? tion, where the body itself is seen as a technical instrument of pure intentionality, but even in theories of communicative action, where the body appears as a mere medium for the intention of self-expression, without resistance and without any weight of its own. The assumption of an unrestricted and permanent availability of the body leads to a theory that is unable to synthesize the objectivity of the