
doi: 10.1007/bf01770226
handle: 10419/220906
A central question in group decision theory is the existence of a simple mechanism that necessarily leads to Pareto optimal outcomes despite noncooperative behavior of the participants. It is shown that the multistage unanimity game is such a mechanism if we assume that the non- cooperative players end at an equilibrium which is symmetric and persistent.
non-cooperative players, ddc:330, Multistage and repeated games, existence of a simple mechanism, multistage unanimity game, group decision theory, Pareto optimal outcomes
non-cooperative players, ddc:330, Multistage and repeated games, existence of a simple mechanism, multistage unanimity game, group decision theory, Pareto optimal outcomes
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