FiniteN-person non-cooperative games with unique equilibrium points

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Sep 1981 English Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLCJournal:International Journal of Game Theory, volume 10, pages 125-129 (issn: 0020-7276, eissn: 1432-1270,

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Authors: Kreps, V. L.;

doi: 10.1007/bf01755957

FiniteN-person non-cooperative games with unique equilibrium points

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Abstract

A necessary and sufficient condition is found for a given completely mixed strategyN-tuple to be the unique equilibrium point of some finiteN-person non-cooperative game.

Related Organizations

Russian Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation

Keywords

Noncooperative games, completely mixed strategy \(N\)-tuple, unique equilibrium, finite \(N\)-person noncooperative game

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