Name: Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
Creator: Roger B. Myerson
Keywords: Noncooperative games, Nash Equilibrium, ddc:330, Proper Equilibrium, 0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences, Perfect Equilibrium

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article , Preprint , Research 01 Jun 1978 English Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLCJournal:International Journal of Game Theory, volume 7, pages 73-80 (issn: 0020-7276, eissn: 1432-1270,

Authors: Roger B. Myerson;

doi: 10.1007/bf01753236

handle: 10419/220655

Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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Abstract

Selten's concept of perfect equilibrium for normal form games is reviewed, and a new concept of proper equilibrium is defined. It is shown that the proper equilibria form a nonempty subset of the perfect equilibria, which in turn form a subset of the Nash equilibria. An example is given to show that these inclusions may be strict.

Related Organizations

Northwestern University
United States
St Petersburg University
Russian Federation

Keywords

Noncooperative games, Nash Equilibrium, ddc:330, Proper Equilibrium, Perfect Equilibrium

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