When I first encountered John Rawls' conception of "justice as fairness," I was wholly sympathetic. I interpreted his approach to be closely analogous, even if not identical, to that aimed at explaining the voluntary emergence of "fair games," with widely divergent applications. Stimulated by Frank Knight and, more directly, by Rutledge Vining (both economists who worked independently of and prior to Rawls), I sensed the possible extensions in the explanatory-descriptive power of models for "rules of games," derived in accordance with some criteria of "fairness." As readers of The Calculus of Consent recognize, Gordon Tullock and I employed such models in our derivation of the "logical foundations of constitutional democracy" (our subtitle), of a political structure not grossly divergent from that envisoned by the Founding Fathers and embodied in the United States Constitution, at least in its initial conception. For these, and other reasons, I looked forward to publication of Rawls' long-promised treatise.