This symposium gives me an opportunity to summarize a few of the important conclusions of my book and to provide some additional examples of the relationship between repressive power, on the one hand, and knowl? edge, on the other, examples that were not discussed in the book. I should like to emphasize that my book shows a distinct preference for specificity. I am interested in the details of particular episodes and in? cidents?who did what to whom, at whose expense and for whose benefit, and with what consequences. That lays me open to the charge of writing at a low level of abstraction or generalization, but I am aware that for many scholars high levels of theoretical abstraction provide convenient op? portunities for evasions of fact and of responsibility. It is difficult to hide behind a narrative of specific events; it has been far easier to avoid looking at what happened ? and to avoid looking at oneself?by taking refuge behind statements of ultimate meaning. I should like to point out two additional conclusions of my investi? gation. The first is that the presence on the campus of intelligence organizations was by no means always the result of their surreptitious and unwelcome intrusion; it was often the response to the invitation of univer? sity authorities. Finally, the relationship between the partners to this collaboration was always a tightly guarded secret, in many places impene? trable ? even to this day. Not only was it secret; it was lied about by the partners each of whom had its own reasons for deceit: the intelligence agen? cies because they did not want the world to know what they were up to; the universities because they wanted to preserve the fiction that they were defenders of the hard-won principle of academic freedom. In case after case, abandonment, even betrayal, of academic principle to obtain govern? ment grants or private funds or to solicit goodwill, was followed by political coercion.