In two papers of the author [Inf. Comput. 96, No. 2, 225-244 (1992; Zbl 0755.03006), J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 3, 17-32 (1991; Zbl 0723.03004)] the term `resolution logic' is introduced to denote a logical system for which a refutationally complete resolution proof system can be comstructed or, putting it differently, to denote a logical calculus whose refutational properties can be expressed in terms of the resolution principle. In a series of papers of the author, a substantial amount of space is devoted to the construction of an algebraic methodological framework to capture and study the properties of resolution logics and their resolution counterparts. In these papers (as well as in the majority of works on resolution), the pursuit of purely technical issues left almost no space for the discussion of the nature and the meaning of the resolution principle. This paper intends to depart from the technical direction and it aims at a possible interpretation of the principle in the context of nonclassical logics.