Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-Optimality
Copyright policy )Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-Optimality
We consider the bargaining problem with a variable number of agents. The first author [J. Econ. Theory 45, No.2, 330-341 (1988; Zbl 0657.90106)] had previously characterized the Nash solution as the only solution to satisfy the following axioms: Pareto Optimality, Symmetry, Scale Invariance, and Multilateral Stability. We show that the disagreement solution is the only additional solution to satisfy the restricted list of axioms obtained by dropping Pareto Optimality.
- Norwegian School of Economics Norway
- University of Rochester United States
axiomatic characterization, bargaining, disagreement solution, variable number of agents, Nash solution, Pareto Optimality, Cooperative games
axiomatic characterization, bargaining, disagreement solution, variable number of agents, Nash solution, Pareto Optimality, Cooperative games
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