Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership

descriptionPublicationkeyboard_double_arrow_right Article 01 Dec 1996 English Publisher:Springer Science and Business Media LLCJournal:Review of Industrial Organization, volume 11, pages 853-860 (issn: 0889-938X, eissn: 1573-7160,

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Authors: Kenneth George; Manfredi M. A. La Manna;

doi: 10.1007/bf00174411

Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership

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Abstract

If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is “small”.

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