This paper describes the general structure of an environmental philosophy. There can be many such philosophies, and those with their roots in economic theory have been extensively studied recently. Specific examples cited in the paper include the work of David Pearce and Robert Goodin. Economics-based philosophies can founder on the issue of externalities and a misplaced attempt to provide a comprehensive approach to valuing nature as a bundle of goods and services. It is argued that it is dangerously easy to slide from considering nature as a standing reserve of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires to the idea that it is nothing more than that. In general, the consequentialist basis of economics limits its usefulness in contributing to informed environmental decisions. But there is room for a sensitive use of institutional environmental economics as a partial guide for our reflections and choices. Any such development should take on board the existence of a plurality of perspectives on fundamental issues and the pluralism of values that can be found within moral theory itself.