We hold that there is no difference, qua act, between an intentional act and an act simpliciter.1 The relationship which exists between acts simpliciter and unintentional or intentional acts is as follows. ‘Unintentional’ means that the standard case of an act has been generically departed from, that the object being described, although having some of the features of a standard action, nevertheless lacks some of its necessary ingredients. It marks a standard deviation from the product deemed the standard of agency. To mistakenly, and therefore unintentionally, call on a person you falsely believe to be another is for an event of your agency to be caused through an intention in whose formation a false practical belief functioned. This object although caused by your agency is not the object you intended: it is not the event you caused as you represented it; it is anisomorphic with your intention. On the other hand, unqualified agency occurs when one’s efficacious intention is informed by true beliefs, and therefore when the intention finds its intentional isomorph effected.